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I've read page after page on this elsewhere and the most significant thing I've read is:

"Why didn't the condition 'AoA Disagree' inhibit MCAS?"

https://blog.thetravelinsider.info/2019/07/did-boeing-secretly-bet-the-company-yet-again-on-an-airline-project.html

Really good article on Boeing and the Max, if a little long, but very insightful...

On the pilots' forum there are very strong suspicions that Boeing have planted "experts" who have been steering the discussions away from Boeing malfeasance and towards pilot error and poor training....

Yes, yes and yes but also consider that Boeing did not disclose the existence of MCAS in any documentation or training. That, in itself, is completely inexcusable in my view. Had the pilots been...

In the two recent MAX accidents it seems one aircraft was lost because the crew didn't operate the Stab Trim Cutout switches and the other was lost because they did operate the Stab Trim Cutout...

TBH I think you have absolutely nothing to worry about now. Even with unmodified ones, even if they might have struggled a bit before the cat is so far out of the bag that no one sitting up front...

Thanks for that!

It's tempting to say "they don't have any choice" but thinking a bit more about this they do. It's "legal" driving that statement. I should think "financial" have already...

Ok. The issue with fault reporting, operations and maintenance and the responsibility for the serviceability of the specific aircraft are interesting yes, but I ask you a question. If an AoA vane...

What exactly are you blaming maintenance staff for?

The problem seems to me to be stretching the limits of an existing design beyond those limits therefore having to create a cludge to meet...

One AoA sensor eh? One. Interesting.

I'm trying to decide whether it's a bold move to ground the whole type, or a bold move to decide not to.