Enjoy...
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/GERMAN%20PLANS%20FOR%20INVASION%20OF%20ENGLAND,%20 1940_0001.pdf
Beppo Schmidt’s response is best summed up as: ha ha ha ... NO.
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The Germans lost the war the day they declared war on Russia, the attrition rate of available resources could never be matched.
The only possible chance would have been if they attacked earlier in 1941, befriended and recruited more Ukrainian/Belorussian soldiers, treated Russian POWs humanely and Japan attached simultaneously from the East and America had not been involved.
Quote Originally Posted by A.Pottinger :
If you're referring to Spain, the difficulty was while the German Luftwaffe had learned some lessons, these did not necessarily reach or were absorbed by the political leadership.
Unfortunately, Hitler used bombing to further his political vision including strategically such as during the BoB, and prior to this, but not necessarily in accordance with what some in the Luftwaffe had learned earlier.
Military adaptation is seldom even and still less the link with policy-makers and political leadership.
Notably, leading scholarship regards Liddell Hart's work as hardly exemplary (e.g., see Professor Sir Hew Strachan's 'The Direction of War').
Some of the best works on air power in WW2 are by Richard Overy, including several addressing the Battle of Britain.
More recently, Phillips O'Brien's work has been well received, including: How the war was won: air-sea power and Allied victory in World War II.[/QUOTE]
I was simply clarifying about Spain given your reference to' debunked myths' included in the thread already, and as the document you quoted did address Spain in terms of the political leadership's actions subsequently.
Liddle Hart was an historian but not an especially good one (see, e.g. Basford, Mearsheimer, or Strachan).
I agree about the largely tactical lessons that the Luftwaffe absorbed quite successfully, thanks for the document link it's a neat one in that regard, imho.
Br, AP.
I agree, and would add that the US President's actions were crucial prior to 7 December 1941 (Pearl Harbour) in preparing the US for war and also in his support for the UK and British Empire Forces that were 'alone'. He did the latter, for example by taking on quite a number in the US establishment to effectively end the US's neutral position in March 1941with the institution of Lend-Lease. There were also other examples, too. Much of Lend-Lease's military utility was the supply of material for the war to the allied side. However, it was also political; his actions sent a clear political message to Germany and others and paved the way to entry (and stimulated US producers).
Br,
AP.
Yes, arrangements were made pre- December 1941 as part of the convoy system but with strict limits.
The US Army did not have a large force but the National Guard did and about twice the number. The National Guard which some consider the modern day militia, you will find many will disagree as do I, is still a large part of the Army and it's reserve units. Even today we run a a small military backed up with a part-time soldier.
The wars in the last twenty years have shown we tend to depend more on the inactive than the active.
Some good posts so far BTW.
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Very interesting reading about Operation Sea Lion! Reading this, causes a domino effect: when you read about some of the details and names, you're drawn to that as well. E.g. the Brandenburger Regiment: known for war crimes in the Netherlands during the May 1940 invasion. First, the Wehrmacht tried to overrun Dutch troops on a hill side (in a flat country, every hill is 'holding the high grounds...). That first attempt failed, then the Brandenburger Regiment gathered Dutch soldiers taken prison during the first two days of the battle. They forced them to go uphill in front of the Germans... Needless to say how that ended. My fathers oldest brother was one of the soldiers taken prisoner and he was forced to act as a human shield. Frankly, he has never recovered from that experience (lived with that memory until he passed away, a week before his 100th b'day).
The attack on the Netherlands in May 1940 was not a success for the German airborne troops. We all know Market Garden, but the Germans 'found their Waterloo' during 3 days in May 1940: capturing the Dutch royal family failed, because the German paras were beaten by counterattacks by the Dutch troops and in Rotterdam, only a handful Marines defended the bridges across the river Meuse and even lured the Germans in a hand-to-hand combat in the early hours of May 13th. Dutch Marines swam across the river at night and attacked the Germans from the flanks. The Germans lost that fight, by retreating to 'safer grounds'. Only the May 14th bombardment of Rotterdam changed the course of history. Just like the Spanish Guernica bombing, it was an attack on civilians. Their 'We'll be on the Dutch beaches washing our socks within a day' ended in 3 days fighting without result and needed to be 'won' by bombing a city.
Then: barges... after the days in May, the Germans had seized river barges from Holland, France and Belgium. To be used as troop and material vessels to cross the channel. Those barges are flat without a keel or daggerboard. Totally unsuited for sea trips! (There's a Grand Design episode where a London couple buys a barge in Holland and after a total refit, the vessel is sailed across the North Sea under its own power. Even then, with a totally flat and calm sea, it's nearly impossible to steer and every attempt to put on more power is useless: 2 - 4 knots/hr (nautical) is all that's achievable. Try to re-view that episode if you like).
Those German barges would have been sitting ducks for the Navy!
My examples only show that the German generals who weren't keen on attacking GB were probably right. The German troops weren't up to it.And, given the modus operandii of the Germans, they would have bombed civilians as well.